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ABSTRACT
The Consequences of Rapid Population Growth on
Nigeria's Economic Development:

A Simple

Econometric Analysis
by
Richard A. Eniang,

~aster

of Science

Utah State University, 1977
t·1ajor Professor: Dr. Bartell C. Jensen
Department: Economics
The purpose of this study was to examine the economic impli cations of a rapid population growth on Nigeria's economic development.
It was particularly interesting to study the relationship, because at
the present Nigeria is making some economic progress while undergoing
a demographic transition.

Apparently, despite the acceptable growth

of the national income, the growth of the per capita output has not
been encouraging.

This output growth must have been hampered by the

rather rapid population growth in Nigeria.
The neoclassica l growth theory was basically employed to expla in
the growth of output in the economy in terms of both capital and labor
inputs.

For i nstance, the short-run impact of a possib l e ferti l ity

decl i ne could lead to increased savings capability, possible through
the curtailment of the consumption of the depe ndent population.

The

l ong-run impact, on the other hand, could be the opportunity to
increase the rate of structural transformation needed to raise labor
productivity and personal income in the economy.

vii
The model revealed that economic growth rates in Nigeria have
been declining with rising affluence.

It is more likely that such

a slowing would arise from the population pressure and resource
limitation rather than from the propensity to invest.
(75 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The classical economic theory of population growth as postulated
by t1althus stated that a rise in incomes, particularly among the
poorer classes in any country, tends to increase fertility rates but
decrease mortality rates.

The cours e of events since Malthus' ti me

has not only negated that theory but has als o led to the grad ual evolution of the theory of demographic transition.

This theory is based

on the hypothesis that man's reproductive behavior is highl y responsive
to his environment, and it typically relates a sequence of birt h and
death rates to a country's economic development.
In a typical agrarian peasant economy, characterized by a high
degree of self-sufficiency and a relatively slow change in production
techniques, birth and death rates are very high.

While the birth

rates may remain high and fairly stable in such a circumstance, the
death rates respond immediately to fluctuations in nutrition, sanitation, and availability of effective preventive and curative medical
practices.

High birth rates are traditionally associated with social

beliefs and customs and the feeling that large numbers of births are
an economic advantage to a peasant family .

For instance, it is often

held that in a predomi nantl y agrarian economy, the benefits of having
children are derived from the utili ty received from enjoying them as
a consumption good, from the income received by them working in a

2

productive capacity for the famil y and the potenti al security of
receiving support and assistance from progeny in old age . 1
As a consequence, therefore, when a country undergoes an evolution from an agra ria n to a specialized market-oriented econ omy, the
transition is often accompanied by a decline in mortality rates while
the decline in fertility rates (if possible) occurs after a substantia l
time lag.
The consequences of population changes on the economic growth of
most countries, especiall y the low-income ones, have attracted much
attention in recent years, partl y because of the rise in aspirations
and plans to raise the per capita output in these economie s.

But

the social and economic consequences of rapid population growt h are
only dimly understood today.

Reasonable quantitative judgments about

the presumed burden of population growth in general, or for specific
countries , are not easily found. 2 Needless to say , a lot of empirical
studies have shown recent scholarly attempts to estimate, at least
in broad terms, the impact demographic factors co uld exercise on an
economy given reliable data.
However, for analyti ca l purposes, the implications of rapid
population growth can be classified into two components:

those which

occur in the long run and those which primarily arise in the short
run as the rate of population growth changes.

The long-run burden of

1

Victor P. Diejomaoh, Economic Development in NigePia: Its PPoblems, Challenges and FPospects (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

University, 1965), p. 80.
2charles Cooper and Sidney Alexander, Economic Development and
Population GPowth in the Midd l e East (New York : American Elsevier
Publishing Company, Inc., 1972) , p. 11.

3

rapid population growth, from the economic standpoint, is its constraining effect on the rate of stru ctural transformatio n needed to
raise labor productivity and personal income in a dual economy .

One

possible approach to determining the long-run effect of population
growth on the rate of growth of per capi ta income is to find out the
proportion of current savings needed to increase the capital stock
sufficiently to maintain a required labor productivity and per capita
incomes.

Clearly, the higher the rate of population growth, the more

capital accumulation is needed just to hold labor productivity constant.

Another approach to the problem is to analyze the level of

per capita income which could be attained if population growth and
hence 1abor force growth were 1ov1ered with the 1evel of unves tments
unchanged .
In the short run, changes in the rate of population growth can
impose immediate burdens on the family and society at large; their
precise nature and extent, however, will depend on the source of the
changes and their effect on the age structure of the population.
Besides creating the dependency burden, changes in fertility patterns
also affect the size of the labor force long before they alter the
population of people old enough to work.

In addition, any changes in

family size and age composition affect per capita incomes associated
with any given total output, and thus may have immediate implications
for consumption, total demand, and capital formation. 3
3Daniel B. Suits, Ward t1ardf in, Srawooth Paitoonpong, and TehPei Yu, "Birth Control in an Econometric Simu lation," International
Economic Review, XVI (February, 1975), 92.
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Nigeria was selected as the area of study partly because, from
the analytical point of view, the relationship between its population
and economic growths is fairly clear.

Presently, the country is mak-

ing some rapid economic progress and is also undergoing a demographic
transition.

Despite the absence of reliable demographic data,

Nigeria is known to have a rapidly growing population.

With a growth

rate of 2.5 to 3.0 percent per annum, the population is getting fairly
large relative to the available resources of the country.

The rather

hastening pace of urbanization which follows in the wake of rapid
population growth has imposed both personal and social costs on the
economy.
There exists a large potantial for rapid economic growth in
Nigeria, but the current drive to exploi t that potential is being
thwarted by the rapid population increase.

For instance, in the past

two decades, a deliberate action to slow the population growth has
been conspicuously left out of existing government pol i cies.

This

attitude is reflected in the Current Third National Development Plan
(1975-80) where it is stated exp l icitly that the demographic factors
i n Nigeria do not appear to constitute any significant or serious
obstacle to domestic economic progress.

It is further felt that

si nce the country is we ll endowed with natura l resources, a caref ul
exploitation will provide the needed basis for building a viable
economy to ensure a steadily rising standard of living for the population in the foreseeab l e future, and especially during the current
phase of the country's demographic transition. 4
4Federal Rep ublic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan
Federal Ministry of Economic Development,
The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 293.
(197 5- 80) (Lagos, Nigeria:

5

The main emphasis of government policies is on accelerating the
rate of economic growth through more purposeful investment programs
in all the producing sectors of the economy, and it is generally believed that the fast pace at which Ni gerian social and economic
development will move is expected to accentuate those forces which
will tend to lower fertility in the long run .
Despite the government stand on population, the general feeling
is that because of the serious impediment posed by the country's large
and rapidly growing population on the achievement of the targeted
economic goals, the population need be slowed to permit, at best, a
sustained development.

Therefore, there is urgent need in Nigeria

for policy makers to meet the challenge as posed by the population
explosion and design appropriate plans to control the accelerating
fertility patterns in the country to create an opportunity for future
development.

6

CHAPTER I I
LITERATURE REVIEW
Historical Background
In many instances, demographic factors have been regarded as
long-run factors in forecasting economic growth of a country or have
merely been assumed as factors contributing to negligible or constant
effects on the economy.

Some of the empirical and related studies
1
already made by Adelman, Blandy, 2 Ekanem, 3 Freedman, 4 Simon, 5 and
Sommers and Suits, 6 to mention a few, have extensively examined the
impact of population growt h on the economic development of countries.

Their conclusions underscore the belief that economic development,
especially in relatively poor countries, could be hampered by rapid
population growth.
1Irma Adelman, "An Econometric Analysis of Population Growth,"

American Economic Review, LIII (June, 1963), 314-339.

2R. Blandy, "Population and Employment Growth: An Introductory
Empirical Exploration," International Labor Review, CVI (October,
1972), 347-366.
3r. Ekanem, "A Further Note on the Relation Between Economic
Development and Fertility," Demography, IX (August, 1972), 383-398.
4oeborah S. Freedman, "The Relation of Economi c Status to Fertility," American Review, LII (J une, 1963), 414-426.
5Julian Simon, "The Value of Avoided Birth s to Underdeveloped
Countries," Population Studies, XX I II (f·1arch, 1969), 61-68 .
6Paul r~. Sommers and Daniel B. Suits, "A Cross-sect ion t·1odel of
Economic Growth," Review of Economics and Statistics, LI I I (t·1ay, 1971),
121-128.
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However, since most of these studies are cross-sectional analyses
with only a few time-series types, the specific results have led many
scholars to conclude that the full advantages which could be expected
from fertility reduction are still greatly misunderstood and underestimated. 7 While the cross-sectional studies have been useful in
determining the general impact of demographic factors on economic
development, the approach might not be very useful in forecasting a
country's economic development since countries differ markedly on
economic, social, and cultural grounds.

For instance, it has been

found that a reduction in fertility as a necessary condition for
increased economic growth could only be valid in the context of a
In richer nations, increased wealth could indirectly lead to increases in family size. 8 Similarly, evidence also
developing country.

shows that the positive correlation between economic growth and level
of literacy could only be found in developing nations, while that
relationship does not necessarily exist in developed nations.

Besides,

the negative correlation between fertility and literacy is more
applicable in poor than rich nations.
Nonetheless, the impediment to economic growth which could be
generated by rapid population increase in low-income countries is
fairly obvious.

The development process is more than just a simple

process of factor augmentation and could be viewed as a process
whereby an increasing number of people is absorbed into different
7Etienne Van de Walle, "Population and Development," in PopuLation Change and Socioeconomic Change in West Africa, ed. by John C.
Caldwell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 152.
8Ekanem, "Economic Development and Fertility," p. 385.
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and more product ive activities in t he economy.

As a result, more

capital services and modern inputs ar e req uired per worker to sustain
t he economic activities .

But, the rate at wh i ch add i tional labor is

absorbed into the modern sector could be restrained and the development process prolonged by accelerating population growth .

For growth

to be possible under the ci rcumstan ces, a greater share of the ou t put must be saved and invested .

Also, in a model of dual economy

in which structural change is a needed result, the already exis ting
savings constraint on development could be aggravated by any rapid
9
population increase.
Therefore, since the attainment of adequate levels of investment
is particularly difficult in relatively low-income areas, the ex istence of an accelerating population growth could onl y wor sen t he
situat i on by limiting the capital available per pers on in the economy.
In developed nations where full utilization and ful l employment of
existing resources are the targets, a rise in aggregate demand could
provide some stimulus to the growth of the economy; and a possible
source of this stimulus has been found to be a rapid population
growth.

But, an economy which suffers from a deficiency of capital

(and not of effective demand) needs a higher schedule of savings
rather than of consumption to generate higher per capita incomes in
the future .

Even though there may be some credibility to the belief

that deficiency of effective demand also presents problems in lowincome economies, adequate stimulus cannot possibly be obtained from
9R. R. Nelson, T. P. Schultz, and R. L. Slighton, Structural
Change in a Developing Economy: Columbia 's Problems and Prospect
(Princeton, New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1971).
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rapid population growth .

For instance, a fast er population growth

might compe l most households in these deficient economies to spread
their meager incomes over their large numbers because there could
be no apparent way in which the large numbers in such circumstances
cou ld immediately be translated into higher consumption expenditures
or higher returns to capital.

Therefore, the real capability to

enlarge consumption could be minimal in these areas .
In general, a more rapid rate of population growth affects the
younger population more than any other group, and therefore it gives
rise to a younger composition of the population and a broader-based
age distribution.

This creates a dependency burden--one that is

primarily borne by families supporting additional surviving children ,
but also transferred in part to the government which provides the
social services to the peop le.

However, the rapid increase in total

population also leads to an increase in the rate of growth of the
adult population; but the notable accelerat io n in the growth of the
populat ion of labor force age occurs abo ut 15 to 20 years after the
decline in mortality has begun and when the surviving cohort of
children born enters the labor force.
Demographic Review:

Patterns and Trends

By any standard, Nigeria has a rapidly growing population.

Three

decennial censuses have already been undertaken in the country, and
although the results are questionable and subject to a lot of contro vers ies, fairly realistic estimates exist which could provide a
general idea on the course of the demo graphi c trends.

For example,

10
the 1965 projected mid-year populat ion estimate was 48 . 7 mill i on
persons, while that for 1975 was 63 mi llion, representing an annual
growth rate of 2. 4 to 2. 8 percent . lO
Basically, the persistent high levels of fertil i ty in Nigeria
have given rise to an age distribution characteristic of low-income
economies--a broad- based pyramid that tapers rapidly with age.

How-

ever, the precise structure of this age di stribution is slightly
obscured by the gross inaccuracies in the age reporting.

Estimates

also show that the proportion of the population 15 years and under
remained at roughly 45 percent, while that for those 15 to 64 years
of age actually decreased from 54 to 52.6 percent within the period
1960 to 1975 . A set of these demographic estimates from 1960 through
2000 is presented in Table 10 (Appendix A).
The demographic evidence is consistent with an historic fall in
crude death rates during the last few decades.

From the estimates,

the crude death rate declined from a level of about 26 per thousand
in 1960 to roughly 22.7 per thousand in 1975.

Further declines in

the crude death, though a possibility, are likely to be more moderate
as further improvements in health services in the country may have to
hinge increasingly on gradual improvements in nutrition, control of
epidemic diseases, and increased personal income.

During the same

period, the crude birth ra t es remained fairly stable at about 49 per
thousand.

As a consequence, therefore, these developments are

essentially responsible for the rapid natural population increases.
10u.s. Department of Commerce, "World Population: 1975 Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World" (unpublished paper; Washington, D.C . , 1975) .
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The range of plausible changes in fertility patterns in Nigeria
is rather narrow.

The fundamental reason why there is uncertainty as

to the future course of fertility in the country is that any major
downward trend can only depend on the existence and the effectiveness
of nationwide programs to reduce the current level of birth performances.

The underlying purpose of this study, therefore, will be

to justify the benefits which could possibly accrue to the economy
from any purposeful fam i ly limitation programs.
Demographic- Economic Interrelations
The demographic influence on an economy can be attributed to
three aspects: effects of population size, rate of growth, and age
distribution. 11 A question then arises as to whether a large population could be advantageous or otherwise to the economy by limiting
the growth of the output per worker and the per capita incomes.

The

classical view is expressed in the theory of the optimum popu l ation
which states that population size in itself is of litt l e importance,
and what matters is the combination of factors of prod uction in the
right proportions.

In a situation of under-population, given a fixed

amount of land and capital, an optimum number of workers is needed
to exploit the available resources.

But if the l abor force does not

reach that number, additional workers might be necessary to bring
forth increasing returns per head, granted there is division of labor
and specialization in the economy.

Conversely, a stage of

11

Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, Population Growth and
Economic Development in Low-Income Countries (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 18 .
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overpopulation exists when manpower is above the optimum amount with
the average product down and a resultant underemployment.
Effects of population size on an economy can be both advantageous
and undesirable .

In small-holder agriculture, for instance, where

most of the population derives its livelihood, there is little room
for specialization and division of labor.

Therefore, within the pro-

duction units a population increa se is not likel y to permit any
economies of size.

Rather, it may result in greater fragmentation of

the production units, thus creating smaller units than the existing
ones.

On the consumption side, the pressure of the Nigerian popula-

tion on subsistence, as an example, is such that the supply of food
is required to keep pace with the demand created by a large population.

Research has also shown that the subsistence food sector in

the country grows at about the same rate as the population.

Besides,

it is feared that Nigeria might run the risk of having its population
press too much on food supplies, to the point of deprivation in the
future in the face of a projected enormous population. 12
The expected advantage of the effects of population size on the
industrial and business sectors of the economy is that of producing a
large market for the manufactured products .

There is, however, little

doubt that Nigeria's large population could be a favorable factor in
the drive for its industrialization.

The mere fact is that under

the Nigerian situation, a large population hampers the improvement of
the standard of living and the purchasing power of the inhabitants;
12 Glenn L. Johnson, Orlin J. Scoville, George K. Dike, and Carl
H. Eicher, "Strategies and Recommendations for Nigerian Rural Development, 1969/85," CSNRD, XXXIII (Ju l y, 1969), 22-24.
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hence, it also inhibits the development of a sizeable effective demand
in the economy.
The rate of population growth is particularly important in
determining the consequences of population changes on the economic
growth of Nigeria.

While there could be economies of scale as the

overhead expenditures are shared among more persons, such gains are
offset by the additional investments needed to maintain or improve
the ratio of existing capital stock to the accelerating population.
Present policies in the country are primarily aimed at realizing a
level of investment which could expand faster than the population
growth to insure a substantial increase in per capita income.

These

investments are usually financed out of savings and foreign capital or
reserves.

In economic planning, the most sophisticated instrument

often used to integrate population growth into an overall strategy
is the so-called development equation whose theory argues that investment should be increased at least at the same rate as the population
to maintain some economic growth:
g

= [ (s/c)

- n]

where g is the rate of increase of per capita incomes; s, the percent
saved out of total income; c, the capital-output ratio; and n, the
rate of population growth.

Thus, from the equation, if a population

should grow at 2 percent per year, and assuming the capital-output
ratio is 3, 6 percent of the GDP should be saved and invested yearly
just to keep per capita income constant, whi le 9 percent will be

14
needed to make it grow by 1 percent a year. 13 Despite the fact that
the above equation is not very applicable in the Nigerian context,
some important facts are evident in it:

the capital stock and the

efficiency of investment must improve or grow faster than the population growth for development to take place.
The age distribution of the population primarily influences the
structure of investments in the economy and particularly at the macroeconomic level.

In a country like Nigeria where high ferti l ity rates

persist, a large part of the population consists of children, with
precise ly more than 40 percent under 15 years of age.

Hence, ex-

penditures on health and welfare, housing, and education tend to
receive more emphasis in the short run.

13van de Wa l le, "Population and Development," p. 145 .
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CHAPTER III
FACTORS IN NIGERIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Review of Sector Roles
Nigeria is a predominantly agricultural economy .

The agricul-

tural sector is fostered very effectively in the process of the
economic development of the country.

Although the proportion of out-

put and employment accounted for by this sector has been declining
in recent years, agriculture is sti l l and wi l l continue to be the
mainstay of Nigerian economy in the foreseeable future.

This is

adequately reflected in the current national po li cy where the improvement of the performance of the sector is an important objective.
Several reasons underly th i s assertion:
l.

The current development plans recognize the relative im-

portance of agriculture and expect substantial gains to be achieved
in this sector and its related areas in order for it to play its role
in the socio-economic growth of Nigeria.
2.

Nigeria, being a popu l ous country, vli l l have agr i culture

furnishing the bulk of the nation's employment opportun i ties, meeting
the rising demand for more and better staple foods and other essent i al
products.

Also , the sector will have to supply most of the country's

raw material requirements for both the domestic industry and export
markets.
3.

The government of Nigeria is f i rmly committed to the po l icy

of development that does not ignore the welfare of any socio-economic

16
group and attempts are made to raise the levels of living for all and
to reduce any intergroup differentials.

For this reason, active

support to agriculture (and more generally the rural sector) has been
stepped up.
The manufacturing sector plays a relatively small role in Nigeria's
economy.

Comparatively, it is underdeveloped relative to the size

and the level of development of the economy.

Nonetheless, in the

past decade, this sector has grown fairly rapidly.

Between 1962 and

1972, the value added in manufacturing and craft grew at a compound
rate of 10 percent per annum; manufacturing alone grev1 at 12 . 2 perDespite this growth, the share of manufacturi ng and craft in

cent .

the Gross Domestic Product (GOP) in that decade increased by only
2.15 percent, from 5.64 percent in 1962 to 7. 79 percent of GNP in
1972. l
Manufactured products in Nigeria are varied and include almost
all essential commodities.

Presently, the volume and variety of these

domestically produced goods is such that most trading outlets continually report that a significant proporti on of their supplies is
from factories located in the country. 2 Hov1ever , most of the existing industries are small, with only a few comparatively large firms.
A brief structure of the manufacturing sector, defined in relative
shares by total value added, is shown in Table 12 (Appendix A).
The importance of mining and quarrying in Nigeria has increased
substantially in the past few years, and this sector now provides the
1Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan,
p. 147.
2oiejomaoh, Economic Development in Nigeria, p. 10.
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nnain momentum for the economic growth of the country.

This increased

i mportance is reflected in the sharp growth of the share of mining
an d quarryi ng in the GOP.

The principal mineral resources of Nigeria

are petroleum, tin, columbite, li mestone, lead, zinc, coal , lignite,
and iron ore.

Petroleum is now the most important mineral product

and its mining alone, for example, rose from 1.1 percent of GOP in
l 962 to 15. 9 percent in 1972 in constant 1962/63 prices.

This

gro~Jth

pattern can be seen in Table 1.
There have also been gradual improvements in commercial, finance,
t ransport, communications, and other social activities.

Public

responsibi lity and hence government participation in these areas
have been increasing in order to ensure an orderly growth and development of the economy.
The general constraints limiting Nigeria's ability to exploit
and develop her resources adequate ly are several .

These include low

producer incentives, transport and distribution bottlenecks, inadequate machinery for effect ive planning, insufficient qualified manpower, and the overall effectiveness of the private and public sectors
of the economy. 3 Presently, there is a relatively strong disposition
and capacity on the part of the governments in Nige ria to adopt and
implement a policy of balanced development in the economy.

3rnternational Bank for Reco nstruction and Development, Nigeria:
John Hopkins
University Press, 1974), p. 5.

Options for Long- Term Deve lopment (Balti more, t1aryland :

Table 1.

Gros s domestic product at constant 1974 prices:

Percentage dist ribution

1970

1971

Percent
1972

1973

1974

36.0

32.0

27.9

24.7

23.4

33.1

39.3

43.4

45 . 1

45.5

Manufacturing & crafts

5.0

4.1

4.8

4. 8

4. 7

Electricity &wate r

0. 3

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.4

Building & cons t ruction

3.5

4. 1

4.7

5.4

5. 7

Distribution

9.1

8. 1

7.4

6.9

6.7
2.3

Sector
Ag riculture
r~ining

&quarrying

Transport & communications

1.8

1.9

2.1

2. l

General government

6.3

5.5

4.6

5.8

6.3

Education

2.7

2.6

2.5

2.3

2.6

Health

0.8

0.6

0.8

0.8

0.9

Other services

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.5

100.0

l 00.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total
Source:

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third NationaL DeveLopment PLan (19?5-80 ) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal t1inistry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 22 .
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Income Differentials and Population Distribution
Adjustment between agriculture and the rest of the economy i s a
difficult task to accomplish .

This is true partly because of the size

of the agricultural sector which still employs about 65 percent of
the total population.

The importance attached to this balance re-

flects the great disparity existing between the farm and non-farm
sectors with respect to production techniques, human skills, values,
customs, motivations, and de velopment requirements.

The belief im-

plicit in this study, therefore, is the f act that a very substantial
progress in the rural sector of the economy is a prerequisite to
the successful development of the Nigerian economy as a whole.
Another consideration of the balance involves the relative
levels of productivity and per capita incomes in the main sectors.
Development experiences in various countries indicate the persistence
of per capita income differentials between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors .

Moreover, this differential tends to be widened

when industrialization and urbanization proceed rapidly, although it
is believed that the differential in most instances helps to redistribute the labor force away from agriculture and other primary
occupations. 4
In Nigeria, for instance, the per capita farm income is still a
low fraction of the per capita non-farm income .

This differential,

however, seems to have been sustained by the persistent constant ratio
of agricultural to the total population and a steady increase in the
4coale and Hoover, Population Gr owth, p. 132 .
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rati o of urba n to t otal popu l at io n.

The links between the rural and

urban situations are exempli fi ed by t he f low of labor into the towns
in search of employment and in re sponse t o the prevailing income
differentials--an on-going process to ensure that the ma ss of the
population shares in the benefits of economic growth.

But under the

rrost optimistic assumptions on the expansion on the non-agri cu ltural
sectors, Nigeria's future with respect to increasing income disparities will depend prima r il y on the course of its agricultural
development .

Prec i sely, in the ne xt decade or so the economic well-

being of the bulk of the population will still depend upon the growth
of incomes and employment opportunities in the rural economy .
An approach to effect a major improvement in the urban-rural
income differentials or the intra-sectoral income dispariti es i s to
br ing the distributional and employment considerations into focus
Md to devote substantially increased resources to improving the rural
infrastructure .

t·1oreover, the promoti on of ru ral small-scale in-

ru stries could provide another impo r tant vehicle for rapid adjustments,
recause the mobility of labor from farms to rural industries could
re greater than from rural to urban settings.

Besides, the problem

of social adjustments could be minimized under such circumstances.
T1e underlying strategy of the emphasis on rural development, therefJre, will be to achieve significant increases in the incomes of the
~ral

population .
Financing Invest ment and Economic Growth
The theory of economic growth states in general that countries

i1 which the pe r capita income i s not increasing might have been
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investing 4 or 5 percent or less of their national income per annum,
whereas progressive economies invest 12 percent per annum or more. 5
Therefore, to achieve a progressive economic growth in a country like
Nigeria, it would be necessary to invest a considerable proport ion
of the national income in ways which can contribute to that growth .
The composition of the total investment program is described in
the Third National Development Plan and is also summarized in Appendix
A of this study.

The developmental outlays include all capital in-

vestments and additions to working capital.

Public investments are

implemented through the government's capital estimates and budgets
on economic, social, and general government programs.

Table 2

summarizes the distribution of the GOP (at current prices) for the
period 1970 through 1975.

It also shows that in the 1975/76 fiscal

year, approximately 20 percent of the GOP went into gross fixed capital formation and about two-thirds of that was public investment.
The relations of the public investment and other public outlays are
presented in Table 9 (Appendix A).

In the year 1975, for instance,

the federal and state governments had a combined capital expenditure
of about N5.4 billion ($8.59 billion), of which 70 percent represented
the capital formation .

Social services (primarily education and health

programs) accounted for another 11.5 percent of the total outlay and
about 8 percent was regional developmental outlays.

Roughly 10 .5

percent of total public outlays in that year could be regarded as

5Arthus Lewis, The Th eory of Eoonomio Gr owth (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), pp . 225-226.

Table 2.

Expenditures on the gross domestic product : Current prices
N t·li 11 ion a
1972
1973

1970

1971

4,834.5
(4,265.9)
(568.6)

5,837.3
(5,241.4)
(595.9)

5,960.2
(5,119.3)
(840.9)

844.9

1,234. 9

5,696.2

l974b

l975b

6,483.1
(5,551.1)
(932.0)

7,808.1
(6,335.4)
(1 ,472. 7)

8,973.4
(7,169 . 7)
(1,803.7)

1,480.0

1,745. 9

2,600.0

3,540.0

7,177.0

7 ,691. 9

8,900.5

14,989.2

17,014.8

-66.8

-323.8

-559.3

-606.3

-923 .4

-758.8

Gross national product

5,629.4

6,853.2

7,132.6

8,294.2

14,065.0

16,256.0

Gross national savings

794.9

1,015. 9

1,172.4

1,811.1

6,257.7

7,282.6

Aggregate consumption
(a) Private
(b) Government
Gross fixed capital
formation
Gross domestic product
at market prices
Less net factor payments
and transfers

aN represents Nigerian Naira (equivalent to about $1.58) .
boevelopment Plan estimates.
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan (1 975-80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal Hi nistry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 24.
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non-developmental since that much was mainly devoted to defense purposes and the general administration of the governments.
The rate of investment and other developmental outlays during
the first plan period (1962-68) was barely sufficient to improve the
per capita output, especially under the prevailing condition of the
rapid population growth .

But further remarkable improvement occurred

during the second plan period (1970-74) with increases in real per
capita incomes and the proportion of national income invested .

It

is believed that these increases in income and savings were aided by
the nation's increasing wealth in petroleum reso urces which, of
course, cannot be relied upon too long into the future.

Finally,

experience has shown that even the 8 percent per annum average growth
rate of the gross domestic product achieved in the period 1970-74 was
hardly satisfactory under the conditions where the population was
growing very rapidly.

The third development plan envisaged an average

growth rate of the GDP of 10 percent per annum, but the very purpose
of maintaining a satisfactory rate of development could easily be
defeated if the current population growth rate is not slowed concomitantly, by policy actions .
Savings and Consumption
Estimates of savings in Nigeria are highly approximate and incomplete.

Table 3 provides a rough idea of the principal sources of

national savings .

From this breakdown, governments apparently supplied

about 77 percent of domestic savings in 1974, mainly from their
surpluses of current revenues over current outlays.

Private savings

Table 3.

Gross national savings

Item
Gross domestic product
at market prices

1974

14,989.2

1975

17,014.8

N milliona
1976

1977

1978

1979

19,415.0

22 ,450. 9

26,206.3

30,862.0

-758.8

-698. 1

-676. 9

-705.0

- 752. l

16,256.0

18,716.9

21,774.5

25,501.3

30,109.9

1,803. 7

2,364.4

2,780.2

3,182. 6

3,769.7

6,335.4

7,169.7

8,182. 3

9,941.6

12,298.6

15,319.6

Gross national savings

6,257.7

7, 282.6

8,170. 2

9,052 .7

10,020.1

11,020.6

Public savings

4,838.7

5,578.7

6,020.4

6,778.4

7,668.9

8,219.9

Private savings

1 ,419. 0

1,703. 9

2,149.8

2,274.3

2 ,351. 2

2,800.7

Less net factor payments

-923.4
14,065.8

Less government
consumption

1,472. 7

Less private consumption

Gross national product

aN represents Nigerian Naira (equivalent to about $1.58).
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third NationaZ DeveLopment PZan (197 5-80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federa 1 ~1i ni stry of Economic Deve 1opment, The Centra 1 Planning Office, 1975), p. 55.
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borrowed for investments was only 23 percent.

The projections on

these estimates also show only a very slight change in the savings
ratio by 1979.
An important source of increased savings capacity is in the
prospective rapid growth of the organized private business sector
which characteristically saves and invests a high proportion of its
own earnings in addition to investing sums borrowed from other savers
and then furnishing the government with a substantial share of its
tax revenues.

Therefore, as industrialization progresses in Nigeria,

the large enterprise sector will increase in importance relative to
the national income and they will also be expected to save and invest
a higher proportion of their earnings than do smaller enterpr ises or
individuals.
Aggreg ate consumption in the economy has been fairly high in the
past, at times reaching a level of approximately 90 percent of GNP.
This ratio has apparently been falling recently to an all-time low
of 55 percent in 1975.

Within this aggregate, however, the differ-

ent movements of the private and public consumption ratio are clearly
discernible.

Public consumption, for instance, rose slightly from

10 percent of GNP in 1970 to 11 percent in 1973 and declined to
approximately 10 percent afterwards.
Private consumption, on the other hand, has been fluctuating in
t he past two decades around a level of 80-85 percent of GNP.

From

1966 to 1973, the average growth rate of private consumption derived
as a residual from the official national accounts estimates was about
6 percent in current prices.

This translated to an equivalent 4
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percent in per capita terms.

During the third plan period (1975-80),

the implied annual growth rate is about 19 percent, and if allowance
is made for a 2.5 percent per annum population growth rate and an
annual price inflation of 6 percent, per capita consumption will
probably rise at 10.5 per annum in real terms.
Productivity of Development and Investment Outlays
Over the past years

and especially the past two decades, in-

vestment opportunities existed in Nigeria when the growth of its
economy averaged about 5.5 percent per annum.

The profitability of

operating at productive capacity in a large domestic market had
hitherto provided adequate investment incentives with a reasonable
degree of protection.

This was probably a major factor in the

continued growth of private investment and savings in the country.
A gradual shift from a structure where growth originated largely
from export-oriented sectors to one which intends to draw its impetus
increasingly from production for domestic demand is very apparent
now in Nigeria .

The major exception to this assertion will be the

oil-producing sector, which will continue to generate the domestic
resources to permit an acceleration of economic growth and provide
the necessary foreign-exchange earnings .

Nigeria therefore should

be able to concentrate on new investments on the provision of goods
and services for domestic use while still maintaining the characteristics of an export-oriented economy capable of building up foreignexchange reserves .
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However, the economic growth potentials of Nigeria in the next
decade or two could best be assessed in terms of the following:
1.

The rate at which the available resources could be allocated

to investments and other developmental.
2.

The efficacy of the outlays in raising productivity.

In the current development plan, sufficient attention was not given
to the question of the prospective ratios between the investment outlays and the growth of the national output.

Nonetheless, historical

experiences in other countries might allow one to assume a capital
output ratio only in relation to the development visualized for a
particular country, the capital stock already at its command, and the
extent to which the available capital resources are being utilized. 6
In making any assumptions for Nigeria, therefore, a few factors need
to be taken into account; viz., the possibility of raising agricultural
yields with relatively small additions to capital equipment, the need
for further expansion of basic industries and services, the lack of
technical skills as reflected in the lower productivity of labor,
the scope for intensive use of equipment in some key industries through
full utilization of capacity, the shortage of necessary economic and
social infrastructure and, of course, the accelerating population
growth .

6
Planning Commission, Fi rs t Five-Year PZan (New Delhi, India:
Government Printing Service, 1955), pp. 19-20.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
General Theoretical Framework
It is generally agreed that overall economic development greatly
influences population growth and is considered an extremely important
factor in determining demographic behavior.

Specifically, there is

little dispute in the argument that a broad-based economic development usually results in major declines in fertility.

But on the

reverse re lationship--the effect of demographic growth on economic
growth and development--a broad range of views exist.

These range

from those suggesting that rapid rates of population growth will
make economic growth impossible, to those suggesting that population
growth rates are only negligible or irrelevant components of the
development process, and to those suggesting that in fact, rapid
population growth will contribute to economic growth.

These differing

views notwithstanding, the popular feeling shows that a country
that experiences rapid population growth will find it more difficult
to achieve a desired economic growth, other things being equal, than
one with a slower rate of population growth.
The study of the relationship can be approached either by examining past historical examples or by the analysis of economic theories
and econometric growth models .

For instance, there are historical

cases of countries experiencing both economic growth and high rates
of population growth.

Brazil and Mexico are good examples.

But it
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is often argued that in these situations, economic growth could have
been even greater had population growth been reduced.
In recent years, however, econometric models have been developed
to observe these relationships.

Three general types can be dis-

tinguished which have been used to estimate the effects of declining
fertility on economic growth.

The econometric growth models, for

instance, utilize the Harrod-Damar production function to link growth
of output to changes in the amount of capital and changes in the capitaloutput ratio .

The neoclassical growth models use both labor and capital

in the production functions.

The third analytical approach is the

investment model, which involves a cost benefit analysis of programs
to reduce fertility.

The proliferation of the analytical approaches

has given rise to many economic arguments for and against reduced
fertility, such that the importance and validity of the few theoretical
relationships often outlined seem to be in dispute.

Besides, the

causal relationships are themselves interactive and complex and there
is not enough empirical knowledge in the world today about these issues.
Simon Kuznets even pointed out that our economic analysis seems
inadequate in its concepts of nonconventional capital inputs, capital
formation, qualities of labor, and economic organization, and coneluded that the broad political, economic and social inputs and preconditions are important but difficult to incorporate into
1
macroanalytic models .
Also, Gunnar 1·1yrdal stated that these kinds
of analysis in terms of capital investment and output, typical of the
1
simon Kuznets, "Population and Economic Growth," Pr>oaeedings
of the Amer i aan Phi Zosophi aa Z Soai ety, III, No. 3 (June, 1967), 184190.
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modern approach to economic problems, are too mechanistic and schematic.

He felt that increased attention has recently been paid to

the economic effects of reduced fertility, and in consequence more
complicated models have been constructed.

But, he said, despite

their disclaimers, they create a false air of precision and confidence
in the models.

He then suggested that there is a possibility of

constructing mode ls more adequate for the purpose, but such models
would have to contain many more parameters and account for many more
interrelations in order to be logically consistent and close to
reality. 2 Coale and Hoover, in their econometric growth model of
India, developed a classical theoretical relationship between a
declining fertility and economic growth as shown in Figure 2. 3 This
model was used to make quantitative estimates of the demographic
effects on economic growth.

Although there are some various criticisms

on the realism of the estimates, the model expresses important relationships worth considering.
The first mechanism in the model shows the short-run benefits
of a declining fertility and its effects upon dependency ratios and
investment potentials.

A fertility decline immediately begins to

reduce the proportion of young dependent persons in the population.
A reduction of this dependent, non-productive population frees capital
that otherwise is spent for its maintenance.

This in turn raises

savings and investment potentials at both micro and macro levels.
2Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of
The Twentieth Century Fund, l96B).
3coale and Hoover, Popula·tion Growth.

Nations (New York:

Higher potential
levels of investment

Full employment
made easier

Figure 2.

Some relationships between declining fertility and economic growth.
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The second mechanism of the model deals with long-run benefits of
a fertility decline .

A decline in fertility does not affect the size

of a country's labor force until at least 15 years later.

After this

lag, the growth of the labor force is expected to decline in order to
permit more capital to be invested per worker .

This raises the capital

output and the productivity per worker.
Besides, per capita income in a reduced-fertility population could
be higher because a larger proportion of the population is expected to
be in the labor-force ages and especially when such a change could be
coupled with the increase in the amount of capital available per worker.
In the case of Nigeria, the demographic impact could best be
assessed by first examining the classical demographic transition
theory which postulates four stages in the population growth of a
developing country:
1.

A traditional period of high birth and death rates in approx-

imate balance and stable population growth.
2. A high growth period characterized by low death rates and
continuing high birth rates.
3.

A transitional period during which the birth rates also de-

cline.
4.

A stable growth period sustained by low birth and death rates.

The decline in the birth rates in phase three, for instance, is
attributed to a combination of socio-economic factors associated with
evolutionary forces such as modernization, urbanization, or industrialization .

Stoln1tz rightly noted that all nations in the modern era

which have moved from a traditional agrarian-based situation to a
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largely industrialized base, have also mo ved from a condition of
high to low mortality and fertility. 4
For the purpose of this analysis, Nigeria is assumed to be in
the second phase of the demographic transition .

The result of the

precipitous decline in mortality while the birth rate remained unchanged is a rapid acceleration in the country's population growth,
reaching, in some instances, rates of

2~

to 3 percent per year .

This

study will strive to examine the effects a possible fertility decline
in Nigeria could have on its dependency burden, defined as the total
number of persons in the population divided by the number in the
labor force ages (15 to 64), on the rate of growth of the labor force,
and the rate of capital formation (and the output per worker in the
economy) .

These influences will then be examined to determine the

impact a slowed Nigerian population could have on the per capita
incomes .
Design for Investigation
The model employed in this study was first developed by Sommers
and Suits in 1971, 5 and was later revised and expanded by Suits and
others in 1976, 6 to permit an explicit investigation of the impact of
4
George Stol nitz, "The Demographic Transition: From High to Low
Birth and Death Rates," in Popu~at i on : The Vita~ Revo~ution, ed. by
Ronald Freedman (Chicago: Aldine, lg65), p. 30.
5sommers and Suits, "Economic Growth," p. 121 .
94.

6suits, Mardfin, Paitoonpong, and Yu, "Birth Control," pp. 93-
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birth control programs .

Although the equations in the two models

were fitted to cross-sectional data, they could also be fitted to
time-series data to permit one to draw some useful conclusions from
the results.

A justification comes from one source of conflicts in

economic cross-section studies in the choice of data.

Considerable

variance exists between countries on a number of values such as
economic, social, and cultural differentials.

It would, therefore,

seem that a more homogeneous sample of observations within a country
could be a more propitious beginning for an interpretation of the
relationship between fertility rates and economic variables.
This model basically utilizes the neoclassical growth theory
where the growth of output in the economy is assumed to depend on
both capital and labor inputs.
Q

f(K,L)

(K,L > 0)

where Q is output, K is capital, and Lis the labor force.

If

f(K,L) is homogeneous of degree one, then

Q=

L~(K * )

where K*

K

= [

Other assumptions are:
K(

dK
= dt)
= sQ

[constant proportion of Q is invested]

where the symbol s represents a constant marginal propensity to save,
and
L

L0 ent (n

>

0) [labor force grows exponentially].

36

For instance, in the short run, a declining fertility tends to
increase per capita income as the rate of consumption of the dependent
population is reduced to permit increased savings and thus allow for
increased capital formation.

But in the long run, the labor force

itself is assumed to grow at almost the same rate as the population,
and especially after the 15-year lag when the last cohort of those
born before the initiation of birth control programs must have entered
the labor force.

Further decline in fertility is not expected to

adversely affect output in the face of high unemployment, since such
an impact could be offset by the poor performance of the marginal
productivity of labor in the country.
Figure 3, a simple one-sector growth model, presents the diagrammatic exposition underlining the above expectations.

One propo-

sition allows for the assumptions that production requires the use
of two basic inputs, labor and capital, employed in a production
function subject to constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal
productiv ity of each factor, and that labor force grows at the rate
(n) and savings equals investment--taken as a constant fraction of
income.

The abscissa of the graph represents capital per worker

(K * ) and the ordinate represents output per worker {q).

0-q graphs

output per worker as a function of capital per worker and '0-(sq)
graphs per capita savings as a function of capital per worker.

The

line 0-(nK*), with slope n (the rate of population growth) graphs
the investment required to provide the new additions to the labor
force with the existing capital per head .
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Figure 3.
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One-sector growth model diagram.

In the long run, other things being equal, the economy tends to
converge on an equilibrium stock of capital per head and hence output
per head, because to keep output per head constant, total output
must grow at the same rate as the population (or labor force).

In

the diagram, such an equilibrium is indicated by the intersection
of 0-(sq) and 0-(nK*) at R where
n

that is, the

outgro~1th

=

s • .9.* ;
K

rate equals the savings ratio divided by the

capital-output ratio.
~lit h

the fert i 1i ty de cline, 0- ( nK * ) tends to rotate downward

to 0-(nK * )' since the investment required to equip the new workers
with the same stock of capital per head will also be lower in that
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circumstance, and subsequently, 0-(sq) rotates to 0-(sq)' to reflect
the increased savings (consumption saved from reducing the dependent
population).

If these conditions prevail, the economy will eventually

converge on a higher equilibrium capital stock per head and a hig her
output per head at T and U, respectively.
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CHAPTER V
RESU LTS AND DI SCUSSI ON
After some experimentation with the data, a simple three-equation
model of economic growth was finally adopted .

These equations are

represented as follows:
1.

GCF/GDP

2.

dN/N

= F1 (GDP/N)

+

u1

F2(GDP/N) + U
2
3.
R = F3 (GCF/GDP, dN/N) + u
3
Equation (1) expresses the fraction of GOP devoted to capital forma=

tion (GCF / GDP) as a function of the level of GOP per capita; equation
(2) expresses the annual rate of population growth as a function of
GOP per capita; and equation (3) expresses the rate of growth (R)
of GOP per capita as a function of the investment ratio and the rate
of population growth.
The equations were fitted to data published in the United Nations
Yearbook of National Accounts 1975.

The variables used and their

units of measurement were:
GDP/N

=

gross domestic product per capita expressed in Nigerian

Naira at constant 1962 prices.
GCF/GDP
d/N

= percentage

= annual

of GOP devoted to capital formation.

rate of population growth expressed as percent

per year.
R = rate of growth in real GOP per capita, expressed as percent
per year.
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The final equations were:
l.

ln(GCF/GDP)

2.

ln(dN/N)

3.

1.282 + 0.399 ln(GDP/ N)
(.293)
=

0.278 + 0.158 ln(GDP /N)

R = -3 . 182 (GCF/GDP) + 27.142 (dN/N)
10.979

The Cochrane- Orcuit iterative techn ique was applied to the equations .
This method provided the best fit since both autoregression and multicollinearity were found to be present in the model.

However, these

results obtained from this technique will obviously be subject to a
simultaneous equation bias .
The positive coefficient on the income term in equation (1)
indicates a tendency for the nation to invest more and a larger
fraction of its GOP as its per capita income rises.

Disappointingly,

the income coefficient was not significant at the 0.05 level.

On the

other hand, in equation (2), the population growth was found to be
positively correlated with the per capita income.
significant at the 0.05 level .

This result was

A rise in the income levels must have

been accompanied by a fall in mortality through the provision of better
health measures, extended medical facilities, increased sanitation
education, and growing urbanization in Nigeria.

Figure 4 indicates

graphically how the variations in population growth rates over the
period 1950- 75 are determined primarily by changes in the mortality
rates .

This is, however, in contradiction with the results of some

cross-section studies where a negative relationsh ip between population
growth rate and per capita income is usual ly found.

The inevitable

difference between these statistics stems from the fact that results,
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Nigeria : Trend in population growth rates.

obtained from combined samples of many countries, are often dominated
by the behavior of the richer nations included in such samples .
Equation (3) shows a negative relationship between the fraction of
GOP invested and the growth rate of the per capita income .

Surpris-

ingly, the result is statistically significant at the 0.05 level .

The

positive coefficient of the population growth rate was caused by the
fact that both population and per capita GOP growth rates were in fact
increasing slightly during the sample period .
On the whole, although t his little model produced results which
were only fairly in general conformity to most of the expectations
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about the growth process in Nigeria, its significance helps to show
the basic interrelationship of the main or control ling elements in
the economy.

According to the model, economic growth rates declined

with rising affluence.

Although this is a reasonable finding, it is

more likely that such a slowing would arise from population pressure
and resource limitations rather than from the propensity to invest.
The shortcomings evident in the results are manifold:
1.

The high standard errors of the coefficients in the above

calculations could have resulted from relatively small dispersion
of the explanatory variables in the sample, and probably coupled
with substantial measurement errors in the data.
2.

The data did not permit a distinction among different types

of capital outlay.

For instance, building and construction, trans-

portation equipment, and machinery were given equal treatment despite
the differences in their contribution to economic growth.
3.

Some important growth factors were neglected entirely; no

recognition was accorded investment in human capital in such forms
as education and public health.
4.

The period for which data were found (1960-1973) was badly

affected by the civil disturbances in Nigeria.
However, it might be useful here to draw on a hypothetical
simulation by some researchers 1 to further illustrate the trade-off
between population growth and economic development.

Two populations,

each with 10 million people, $1 billion GNP, output per worker of
1
suits, Mardfin, Paitoonpong, and Yu, "Birth Control," p. 103.
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$312, rate of capital formation of 16 percent, and labor force ratio
of 32 percent were assumed in year 0.
The birth and death rates in both societies were also assumed to
be roughly 40 and 15 per 1,000, respectively .

These populations were

made to differ in that with a crude birth rate of 40 per thousand,
one population has an additional 40,000 births; while in the other,
a 10 percent decline in fertility resulted in averting approximately
40,000 of these births.

The situation in these two societies as of

one year is reproduced in Table 4.

The first column gives results

as were simulated in the absence of bi rth control and the other
shows the outcome from averting 40,000 births.

co lu~n

The last column is

the difference between the first two columns.

Table 4.

Simulation of the effects of a birth control program:
year
After one .l':ear with
40,000
No birth
births
control
averted

Population
Labor force
Output per worker
(dollars)
GNP (milltons of $)
Consumption (do)
Investment (do)
Per capita (do llars)
GNP
Consumption
Investment
Source:

10,253,700
3,281,200

10,213,700
3,295,400

First

Increase
due to
birth
contro 1
-40,000
14,200

319.2228
1 ,047 . 43
881.31
166 .12

320.1402
1,055. 00
879.05
175.95

.9147
7.57
-2.26
9.83

102 . 1514
85.9504
16.2010

l 03.2920
86.0652
17.2268

1.1406
. 1148
1. 0258

Daniel B. Suits, Ward t1ardfin, Srawooth Paitoonpong, and
Teh-Pei Yu, "Birth Control in an Econometric Simulation,"
International Economic Review, XV I (February, 1975), 103 .
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It could be observed that a prevention of 40,000 births, other
things being equal, would mean a population smaller by that amount .
Despite the smaller population, the labor force seems larger, primarily because the effect of reduced births is only noticeable in
the long run.

The increased productivity per worker was attributed

to increased investment per capita.

The combined effect of a larger

labor force and increased productivity in the short run produced a
sizeable gain in the GNP.

The productivity gain is generated by the

increase in gross capital formation which exceeds the rise in GNP
in magnitude.

This is also because reduced population invariably

leads to lower consumption.
However viewed, it seems clear that a prevention of 40,000 births
can give rise to substantial economic gain.

At the minimum, the

gain measured by the $7 . 5 million rise in GNP and spread over the
40,000 births yields an increase of about $188 per birth averted.
A better measure used showed a gain of $12 million as the value due
to the existence of a control program as a minimum estimate.

This

figure was arrived at by taking the per capita GNP of $102.15 obtained
in the absence of birth control and multiplying it by 10,213,000
people found in the population where birth control was effected to
arrive at a GNP of $1,043 million.

The gain thus was the difference

between this figure and the $1,055 million available.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary and Conclusions
Nigeria ' s high rate of population growth has long been accepted
as a serious obstacle to a faster economic growth.

Unfortunately, no

program or a deliberate attempt has been made yet to reduce fertility.
The First National Development Plan (1962-68) formally recognized the
problem and stated thus:
The population is increasing at a faster rate than
the provision of new facilities. Health services,
housing, schools, transport, and water are already inadequate. Despite major investments, the situation is
liable to deteriorate further if the present rate of
population increase continues. 1
The Second Development Plan (1970-74) went a step forward to provide a framework for expanding and integrating family planning programs.

Specifically, a Population Council was established to coordi-

nate all population policy activities.

The Plan described the

situation as follows: .
Nigeria is going through a demographic transition
phase of rising birth rate and declining death rate, leading to a potentially high rate of popul ation growth .
Available evidence suggests an estimated population growth
rate of 2. 5 percent per annum. Per capita income is, by
world standard, still low. The youth dependency ratio is
quite high and so is the rate of urbanization. Given the
structure and techniques of production, a high proportion
of the gainfully occupied population is concentrated in
low-productive sectors of national economic activity.
There is therefore, a high rate of urban unemployment
1Federal Government of Nigeria, First Nationa~ Deve~opment P~an
(Lagos, Nigeria: F. r-1.E.D.R., 1962), p. 93.

11962-6 8)
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and disguised unempl oyment . All t hese factors combined,
wou ld have suggested stringent population control measures,
but for her resource base and development potentials .
The magnitude of the country's population is unlikely
to be such that calls for extensive emergency action.
Given the promising resource base of the economy, the
country can, through careful planning, succeed in buyi ng
time to ward off undue population pressure. What seems
appropriate in the present circumstances of Nigeria is
for the government to encourage the citizens to develop
a balanced view of opportunities for individual family
planning on a voluntary basis, with a vi2w to raising
the quality of life of their offsprings.
The thinking of the currently operative Third Development Plan
(1975- 80) is much the same as that of its immediate predecessor.

The

belief that actions to curb population growth could wait is both unnecessa ry and unfortunate .

Definitely, rapid population growth places

an economy at a disadvantage for a number of reasons.
capital formation.

First, it retards

Directly productive capital must be expanded merely

to provide for the population growth.

Complicating the capital prob-

lem is t he fact that a country with a rapidly growing population is
fu rt her burdened in her development effort by the inability to save.
Populations with heavy dependency burdens have their saving capacity
reduced considerably, because children constitute a drain on income,
as t hey are primarily consumers and produce very little .

It could

probably be argued that savings from petroleum exempt Nigeria from
thes e conclusions, but such argument might overlook the fact that
income growth could have been even greater had the rate of population
grow:h been less.
Second, rapid population growth burdens de velopment in that it
inte rferes wi t h human capital formation.

Larger resource commitments

2
Federal Government of Nigeria, Seaond Nationa~ Deve~opment
(Lagos, Nigeria: F.M. E. D.R . , 1970), pp. 77-78.

(19 70- 74 !

P~an
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are requ i red to tra in a given proportion of the new labor force
entrants.

Evidence also shows that a rapidly growi ng population

tends to produce a low sk illed to unskilled ratio in the labor fo rce.
The refore, the impact of a reductio n in the rate of population
growth on the rate of growth of Nigeria's per capita income could be
traced through three different paths:
l.

The national income is shared by a smaller population .

2.

The accumulation of capital.

Capital is assumed to increase

because a reduction in fertility enables a country to save from the
income which otherwise would have been consumed.
3.

The growth of the labor force .

The reduction of the rate

of growth of the labor force, in the long run, is desirable in
Nigeria where there is "surplus unskilled labor" and hi gh unemployment .
The cost elements which might be involved in effecting any
fertili ty decline are not much of a problem.

Zaidan, for instance ,

observed that the resources which may be required to achieve a desired
increase in living standards are many times lower if they are used
to reduce fertility than in any alternative investment. 3 A lot of
existing evidence also seems to indicate that the costs usually
incurred in any population control program are only a small proportion of the total expenditures on development (roughly a maximum of
3 percent).

Although insufficient data had tended to limit the scope of
th i s study in its form, the analysis has been helpful in demonstrating
3

George C. Zaidan, "Population Growth and Economic Development,"

Studies in Family Planning, XLII (r1ay, 1969), l.
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the important role of demographic factors in economic growth of
Nigeria.

This study also tried to underscore the great pay-off avail-

able from investments in birth control in absolute terms.
Recommendations
The simple case against rapid population growth in a country
like Nigeria is that it absorbs large amounts of resources which
otherwise could be used for development.

Indeed, if all the resources

released by a slowing down of population growth were to be adequately
utilized, such a program holds out the prospects of accelerating
economic growth.
There are a few alternative courses of action Nigeria could take
to achieve a reduction in her population growth rate.

These alter-

natives are:
1.

Nigeria could continue with its present policy of making no

special efforts to limit its population and depend upon those
natural, economic, psychological, and sociological processes to
achieve acceptable levels of fertility.
2.

It could also emphasize those programs within the economic

development mix thought to reduce fertility, such as urbanization,
industrialization, secularization, or even education.
3.

An important alternative is to carry out programs of informa-

tion about family planning in conjunction with the provision of
free and inexpensive medical services.
4.

A possible approach could be for the country to engage in

aggressive propaganda to persuade people to have smaller families.
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Or better still, to ma ke incentive payments to families that avoid
births .
These alternatives are, however, not intended to be mutually
exclusive .
combination .

In fact, they could be undertaken separately or in some
Specifically, alternative (2) may provide a structure

for (3) and (4).

Current policies in Nigeria hinge on alternative

(l) and partly on (2).

In order to reap immediate benefits, the

country needs a decisive policy on population to allow for alternative
(3) or (4) to be implemented,
However, it is important to stress that control of the population
growth alone will not guarantee Nigeria's economic development .
Nigeria can and probably will continue to grow despite its rapid
population growth.

A reduced population growth will only provide the

country with a unique opportunity to accelerate her economic development.

Economic planners, by failing to direct attention to this

area, are ignoring an area which has a potential to make substantial
contributions to economic progress .
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APPENDICES

Table 5.

Gross domestic product at constant 1974 prices

Sector

1970

1971

N milliona
1972

1973

l97il

Agriculture, etc.
Mining and quarrying
~1anufacturi ng and crafts
Electricity and water
Building and construction
Distribution
Transport and communications
General government
Education
Health
Other services

3,399.7
3,127 .9
475.1
29.6
326.0
854.5
172.0
594.6
257.5
71.7
133.5

3,575.3
4,392.7
460.3
35.7
460.2
907 . 1
209 . 5
614.9
296 . 2
74.1
151.9

3,351.8
5,202.9
570.1
42.4
567.1
882 . 5
257.6
551.4
302.2
92 . 2
172.9

3,246.5
5,927.6
626.5
52.0
710.8
910.6
278.2
764.3
312.5
109.8
196.7

3,372.7
6,552.3
683.9
58.7
821.4
971.2
325 . 0
901.8
376.4
132.0
215.3

GOP at factor cost

9,442.1

11,177.9

11,993 . 1

13,135.5

14,410.7

18.4%

7.3%

9.5%

Growth rate

----

--

~

9.7%

aN represents Nigerian Naira (equivalent to about $1.58).
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan (1975- 80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal t·l inistry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 21.

"'
"'

Table 6.

Gross domestic expenditures at current prices
Item

Private final consumption
expenditure
Government: Final consumption expenditure
Gross fixed capital
formation
(a) Public
(b) Private
Exports of goods and nonfactor services
Less imports of goods and
non-factor services
Gross domestic product at
market prices

1974

-1975

N mill iona
1976
1977____ T97B- ---T9T9

6,335.4

7,169.7

8,182. 3

9 ,941. 6

12,298.6

15,319.6

1,472. 7

1,803. 7

2,364.4

2,780.2

3,182.6

3,769.7

(1,600)
(1,000)

(2,340)
(1,200)

(3,015)
(1,450)

(3,815)
(1,850)

(4,810)
(2,440)

(6,020 )
(3,060 )

6,837.2

7,558.2

8,368.6

9,144. l

l 0,110 . 1

11,159. 8

2,256.1

3,056.8

3,965.3

5,080.0

6,635 . 0

8,467. l

14,989 . 2

17,014.8

19,415.0

22,450.0

26,206. 3

30,862.0

aN represents Nigerian Naira (equivalent to about $1.58).
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Pl an (1 975- 80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal t-linistry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975 ) , p. 52.

"'
"'

Table 7.

Growth rates of the GOP at constant 1974 prices
Sector

Agriculture

1971

Percent
1972
1973

1974

5.2

-6.3

-3 . 2

3.9

40.4

18 . 4

13.9

l D. 5

3.1

23.9

9. 9

9.2

Electricity and water

20.6

18.8

22.6

12.9

Building and construction

41.2

23 . 2

25.3

15.6

6.2

-2.7

3. 2

6.7

21.8

23.0

8.0

16.8

3.4

-10.3

38.6

18.0

15.0

2.0

3.4

20.4

3.3

24.4

19. l

20.2

Other services

13.8

13.8

13.7

9.4

Aggregate annual growth rate

18.4

7.3

9.5

9.7

Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing and crafts

Distribution
Transport and cormlUni cations
General government
Education
Health

Source:

Federal Republ ic of Nigeria, Third Nat i onal Development Plan
(1975 - 80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federa l f·1 inistry of Economic
Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 22.

Table 8.

Gross fixed capital formation by type of asset (current prices)
~=

Item

1974

% Share

1975

% Share

1976

% Share

Building and construction

2,056.1

79.1

2,799.5

79.1

3,520.7

78.9

176.6

6.8

240.7

6.8

321 .5

7.2

346.3

13. 3

471.5

13.3

593.8

13.3

Transport equipment
~\a

chi nery

Land improvement
Total
Source:

21.0

0.8

28.3

0.8

29.0

0.6

---

--

---

--

---

--

2,600.0

100.0

3,540.0

100. 0

4,465.0

100.0

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third NationaZ Deve Lopment PZan (1975- 80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal 1-linistry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 54.

"'OJ
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Table 9o

Public sector capital programs:

1975

Federal
government

N mill ion a
Total all
states

3 '1490 645

6040 658

3,754o303

Social

388o629

2170923

606o552

Regional development

243 0155

195 o435

438o590

Administration

493o534

68o343

561 0877

4,274o963

1,086o359

5,3610322

Sector

Economic

Total

Total all
governments

aN represents Nigerian Naira (equivalent to about $l o5B)o
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan
(19 75- BOJ (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal t-1 inistry of Economic
Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), Po 220

Table 10.
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1885

Population and labor force estimates and projections by sex, 1960-85
Po~ulation

tlale
21,685
24,579
27,686
31,577
36,381
42,269

(in thousands )
Tota1
Fema1e
21 ,262
24,097
27,387
31,445
36,403
42,432

42,947
48,676
55,073
63,022
72 '784
84,701

t1a1e

Labor force (in thousands)
Fema1e
Total

11 ,249
12,500
13,803
15,242
16,905
18,988

7,273
7,951
8,731
9,652
10,702
11 '986

18,523
20,451
22,534
24,895
27,607
30,974

2.1
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.4

1.8
1. 9
2.0
2.1
2.3

2.0
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.3

Annual rate of increase (%)
1960-65
1965-70
1970- 75
1975-80
1980-85
Source:

2.5
2.4
2.7
2.9
3.0

2.5
2.6
2.9
3.0
3.1

2.6
2.5
2.6
2.9
3.1

International Labor Office, Labor Forae Projections, Part II (Geneva, Switzerland :
national Labor Office, 1971).

Inter-

"'

C>

Table 11.

Nigeria:

Selected demographic indicators (1960-2000)

Year

Total
population
(in thousands)

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

42,947.0
48,676.0
55,073.0
62,925.0
72,596.0
84,400.0
98,497.0
115,258.0
134,924 .0

Source:

Population ars
to total (%
15-64
0-14
44.8
44.8
44.8
45.1
45.5
46.1
46.5
46.6
46.3

U.N. Working Paper Number 55, p. 55.

54.1
54.0
52.9
52.6
52.1
51.4
50.9
50.7
50.9

Vital rates
thousand )
Crude birth
Crude death
(~er

50.5
50.0
49.6
49 . 3
49.2
48.9
47 . 7
46.4
44.8

26.2
25 . 0
24.2
22.7
21.1
18. 8
16.9
15.1
13.4

Table 12.

Relative structure of manufacturing by value added and employment
1965 (%)
Value
Employadded
ment

Food and animal products
Liquor and drinks
Tobacco
Textiles
Leather goods
Woods and wood products
Paper and printing
Chemical products
~~i nera 1s
Rubber products
Hardwares
r~achinery, equipment, and appliances
Total
Source:

1971 (%)
EmployValue
added
ment

1972 (%)
Value
Employadded
ment

12.9
15.9
n.a.
12.3
2.3
3.8
3.8
12 .3
n.a.
2.3
12.0
2.5

11.6
4.0
n.a.
17.7
3.0
10.6
7.5
6.5
n.a.
1.8
14.6
2.0

10.1
15.0
9.7
16.0
1.5
2.7
3.4
14.6
8.3
2.8
12.9
1.4

14.0
3.0
2.9
21.5
3.1
10.6
7.4
9.5
0.3
4.1
18.6
2.1

10.5
13.1
8. 7
16.5
0.8
3.3
4.0
14.3
9.4
2.4
15.1
1.4

15.7
3.3
2.5
24.0
2.4
8.9
7.9
10.4
0.3
1.8
18.3
1.9

--

--

--

--

--

--

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third NationaZ DeveLopment PZan {1975-80) (Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal Ministry of Economic Development, The Central Planning Office, 1975), p. 148.
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